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Séminaire mensuel de la Chaire ACPR « Régulation et Risques Systémiques »

 

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR, organisé mensuellement, se concentre sur les questions de régulation et de risque systémique pour les banques et les organismes d’assurance. Cette page présente les éléments relatifs aux événements, passés ou à venir, ainsi que les modalités de participation.

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR se déroule habituellement le premier mercredi de chaque mois de 10h00 à 11h30 à l’ACPR : 4 rue de Budapest, Salle Liège (rez-de-jardin) - Voir plan d'accès.  

Le séminaire est ouvert à tous. L’inscription par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr est gratuite mais obligatoire pour y assister. Si vous souhaitez être informés des prochains évènements, merci d’envoyer un mail à la même adresse.

La Direction des Études de l’ACPR organise également des séminaires indépendants : la page dédiée aux séminaires de recherche organisés par l’ACPR est accessible ici.

 

PROCHAIN ÉVÉNEMENT

Mercredi 3 avril 2024, 10h30 – 12h

Enrico Sette (Banque d’Italie) présentera


“Interlocking directorates and competition in banking”

Abstract:

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.

 

Ce séminaire aura lieu en mode hybride (le séminaire se tiendra à l’ACPR : 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris avec possibilité de suivre en distanciel)

L’inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire (pour les 2 modes de participation) par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Si vous optez pour le mode visio, le lien de connexion vous sera envoyé prochainement

- Pour nous contacter

 

DERNIER ÉVÉNEMENT

Mercredi 6 mars 2024, 10h30 – 12h

Olivier De Jonghe (Banque Nationale de Belgique et Université de Tilburg) présentera

« Bank Specialization and Corporate Innovation »

Abstract:

Theory offers conflicting predictions on whether and how lenders’ sectoral specialization affects firms’ innovation output. In this paper, we therefore empirically examine the effect of bank specialization on corporate innovation. We find that the sign and the magnitude of this effect varies with the degree of “asset overhang” risk across sectors, which is the risk that a new technology has negative spillovers on the value of a bank’s original loan portfolio. Using patent data to measure firms’ innovation output, our results show that bank specialization improves innovation for firms operating in sectors with low asset overhang risk, but impedes innovation for firms operating in sectors with high asset overhang risk. These results hold for four different measures of asset overhang risk and various robustness checks. We further find that these heterogeneous effects arise through financial contracting. On average, bank specialization eases firms’ financing conditions, but this does not hold for firms operating in innovative sectors with high asset overhang risk. Overall, our findings provide novel insights into the dual facets of bank specialization and, more broadly, the link between banking and innovation.

 

Ce séminaire aura lieu en mode hybride (le séminaire se tiendra à l’ACPR : 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris avec possibilité de suivre en distanciel)

L’inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire (pour les 2 modes de participation) par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Si vous optez pour le mode visio, le lien de connexion vous sera envoyé prochainement

- Pour nous contacter

- Compte-rendu

 

 

Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Bank resolution and the structure of global banks

We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers...

  • Publié le 15/12/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (430.5 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Adverse Selection on maturity : Evidence from online Consumer

Longer loan maturity provides borrowers with insurance against future changes in the price of credit. The present paper examines whether, consistent with theories of insurance markets with private information, maturity choice leads to adverse selection...

  • Publié le 08/11/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.44 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Lending Standards Over the Credit Cycle

We analyze how rms' segmentation into credit classes a ects the lending standards applied by banks to small and medium enterprises over the cycle. We exploit an institutional feature of the Italian credit market that generates a discontinuity in...

  • Publié le 04/10/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Why risk is so hard to measure ?

This paper analyzes the reliability of standard approaches for Financial risk analysis. We focus on the difference between value–at–risk and expected shortfall, their small sample properties, the scope for underreporting risk and how estimation can be...

  • Publié le 13/09/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (247.23 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Run for Safety : Financial Fragility and Deposit Insurance

We study a run on uninsured deposits in Danish banks triggered by a reform that limited deposit insurance coverage. Using a unique dataset with information about all individual bank accounts, we show that the reform caused a 50% decrease in deposits...

  • Publié le 07/06/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.36 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Banks' response to negative interest rates : Evidence from the Swiss exemption threshold
  • Publié le 03/05/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (824.9 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Winning Connections? Lobbying and the Resolution of Failed Banks

This paper studies how lobbying activities affect the resolution of failed banks during the Great Recession. We show evidence from failed-bank auctions that lobbying increases a bidder’s probability of winning by 26.4 percentage points. The transfer to...

  • Publié le 05/04/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (956.73 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Regulatory reform and risk-taking : replacing ratings

We analyze a reform of insurance companies’ capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities. First, credit ratings were replaced as inputs to capital regulation. Second, the redesigned system ensures capital buffers sufficient to withstand expected...

  • Publié le 15/03/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (697.42 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Impact of Supervision on Bank

We introduce a novel instrument to identify exogenous variation in the intensity of supervision across U.S. bank holding companies based on the size rank of a bank within its Federal Reserve district. We demonstrate that supervisors record more hours...

  • Publié le 01/02/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (521.98 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
What drives the expansion of the peer-to-peer lending ?

Mercredi 4 janvier 2017, 10h à 11h30

  • Publié le 04/01/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.52 Mo)