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Séminaire mensuel de la Chaire ACPR « Régulation et Risques Systémiques »

 

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR, organisé mensuellement, se concentre sur les questions de régulation et de risque systémique pour les banques et les organismes d’assurance. Cette page présente les éléments relatifs aux événements, passés ou à venir, ainsi que les modalités de participation.

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR se déroule habituellement le premier mercredi de chaque mois de 10h30 à 12h à l’ACPR : 4 rue de Budapest, Salle Liège (rez-de-jardin).

Le séminaire est ouvert à tous. L’inscription par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr est gratuite mais obligatoire pour y assister. Si vous souhaitez être informés des prochains évènements, merci d’envoyer un mail à la même adresse.

La Direction des Études de l’ACPR organise également des séminaires indépendants : la page dédiée aux séminaires de recherche organisés par l’ACPR est accessible ici.

 

PROCHAIN ÉVÉNEMENT

Mercredi 2 octobre 2024, 10h30 – 12h

Oussama Houari (Université de Nantes) présentera

“Climate Risks and Economic Activity in France : Evidence From Media Coverage”
 

Abstract:

Abstract: This study investigates the impact of climate risks on economic activity in France. Using natural language processing methods on three major French newspapers (Le Monde, Les Echos, and Le Figaro) in 2000-2023, we construct a measure of climate risks that we disentangle into physical- and transition-risk components. Our findings highlight several transmission channels through which climate risks affect the economy: the business cycle channel, the precautionary savings channel, the inflation channel, and the banking/credit channel. Moreover, while we document the existence of heterogeneous responses to our measures of physical and transition risks, we find that the tone of media covering climate risks matters beyond the frequency of published articles. Our findings show that the media plays a crucial role in influencing public beliefs about climate change related issues.

 

Ce séminaire aura lieu en mode hybride (le séminaire se tiendra à l’ACPR : 4 Place de Budapest, 75009 Paris avec possibilité de suivre en distanciel)

L’inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire (pour les 2 modes de participation) par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Si vous optez pour le mode visio, le lien de connexion vous sera envoyé prochainement

- Pour nous contacter

- Article

 

DERNIER ÉVÉNEMENT

Mercredi 4 septembre 2024, 10h30 – 12h

Gyöngyi Lóránth (University of Vienna et CEPR) présentera

“Common Deposit Insurance, Cross-Border Banks and Welfare

Abstract:

We study the effects of the introduction of a supranational authority responsible for common deposit insurance in a model of cross-border banks with both endogenous risk-taking and within-group risk-sharing possibilities. With national deposit insurance, local authorities inefficiently ring-fence resources flowing from healthy to impaired subsidiaries for high asset correlation. The anticipation of ring-fencing discourages cross-border bank integration. Common deposit insurance removes ring-fencing and encourages cross-border integration, but has an ambiguous impact on the banks' risk-taking incentives. Overall, common deposit insurance increases welfare when banks are sufficiently risky, but otherwise can lead to excessive cross-border integration and lower welfare.

 

Ce séminaire aura lieu en mode hybride (le séminaire se tiendra à l’ACPR : 4 Place de Budapest, 75009 Paris avec possibilité de suivre en distanciel)

L’inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire (pour les 2 modes de participation) par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Si vous optez pour le mode visio, le lien de connexion vous sera envoyé prochainement

- Pour nous contacter

- Article

- Compte-rendu

Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Bank resolution and the structure of global banks

We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers...

  • Publié le 15/12/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (430.5 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Adverse Selection on maturity : Evidence from online Consumer

Longer loan maturity provides borrowers with insurance against future changes in the price of credit. The present paper examines whether, consistent with theories of insurance markets with private information, maturity choice leads to adverse selection...

  • Publié le 08/11/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.44 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Lending Standards Over the Credit Cycle

We analyze how rms' segmentation into credit classes a ects the lending standards applied by banks to small and medium enterprises over the cycle. We exploit an institutional feature of the Italian credit market that generates a discontinuity in...

  • Publié le 04/10/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Why risk is so hard to measure ?

This paper analyzes the reliability of standard approaches for Financial risk analysis. We focus on the difference between value–at–risk and expected shortfall, their small sample properties, the scope for underreporting risk and how estimation can be...

  • Publié le 13/09/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (247.23 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Run for Safety : Financial Fragility and Deposit Insurance

We study a run on uninsured deposits in Danish banks triggered by a reform that limited deposit insurance coverage. Using a unique dataset with information about all individual bank accounts, we show that the reform caused a 50% decrease in deposits...

  • Publié le 07/06/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.36 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Banks' response to negative interest rates : Evidence from the Swiss exemption threshold
  • Publié le 03/05/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (824.9 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Winning Connections? Lobbying and the Resolution of Failed Banks

This paper studies how lobbying activities affect the resolution of failed banks during the Great Recession. We show evidence from failed-bank auctions that lobbying increases a bidder’s probability of winning by 26.4 percentage points. The transfer to...

  • Publié le 05/04/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (956.73 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Regulatory reform and risk-taking : replacing ratings

We analyze a reform of insurance companies’ capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities. First, credit ratings were replaced as inputs to capital regulation. Second, the redesigned system ensures capital buffers sufficient to withstand expected...

  • Publié le 15/03/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (697.42 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Impact of Supervision on Bank

We introduce a novel instrument to identify exogenous variation in the intensity of supervision across U.S. bank holding companies based on the size rank of a bank within its Federal Reserve district. We demonstrate that supervisors record more hours...

  • Publié le 01/02/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (521.98 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The impact of supervision on bank performance

Mercredi 1er février 2017, 10h à 11h30

  • Publié le 01/02/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (665.34 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
What drives the expansion of the peer-to-peer lending ?

Mercredi 4 janvier 2017, 10h à 11h30

  • Publié le 04/01/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.52 Mo)