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Séminaire mensuel de la Chaire ACPR « Régulation et Risques Systémiques »

 

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR, organisé mensuellement, se concentre sur les questions de régulation et de risque systémique pour les banques et les organismes d’assurance. Cette page présente les éléments relatifs aux événements, passés ou à venir, ainsi que les modalités de participation.

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR se déroule habituellement le premier mercredi de chaque mois de 10h30 à 12h à l’ACPR : 4 rue de Budapest, Salle Liège (rez-de-jardin).

Le séminaire est ouvert à tous. L’inscription par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr est gratuite mais obligatoire pour y assister. Si vous souhaitez être informés des prochains évènements, merci d’envoyer un mail à la même adresse.

La Direction des Études de l’ACPR organise également des séminaires indépendants : la page dédiée aux séminaires de recherche organisés par l’ACPR est accessible ici.

 

PROCHAIN ÉVÉNEMENT

Mercredi 4 septembre 2024, 10h30 – 12h

Gyöngyi Lóránth (University of Vienna et CEPR) présentera

“Common Deposit Insurance, Cross-Border Banks and Welfare

Abstract:

We study the effects of the introduction of a supranational authority responsible for common deposit insurance in a model of cross-border banks with both endogenous risk-taking and within-group risk-sharing possibilities. With national deposit insurance, local authorities inefficiently ring-fence resources flowing from healthy to impaired subsidiaries for high asset correlation. The anticipation of ring-fencing discourages cross-border bank integration. Common deposit insurance removes ring-fencing and encourages cross-border integration, but has an ambiguous impact on the banks' risk-taking incentives. Overall, common deposit insurance increases welfare when banks are sufficiently risky, but otherwise can lead to excessive cross-border integration and lower welfare.

 

Ce séminaire aura lieu en mode hybride (le séminaire se tiendra à l’ACPR : 4 Place de Budapest, 75009 Paris avec possibilité de suivre en distanciel)

L’inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire (pour les 2 modes de participation) par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Si vous optez pour le mode visio, le lien de connexion vous sera envoyé prochainement

- Pour nous contacter

- Article

 

DERNIERS ÉVÉNEMENTS

Mercredi 5 juin 2024, 10h30 – 12h

Glenn Rudebusch (Brookings Institution et New York University) présentera
 

“The Effect of U.S. Climate Policy on Financial Markets: An Event Study of the Inflation Reduction Act”
 

Abstract:

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) represents the largest climate policy action ever undertaken in the United States. Its legislative path was marked by two abrupt shifts as the likelihood of climate policy action fell to near zero and then rose to near certainty. We investigate equity price reactions to these two events, which represent major realizations of climate policy transition risk. Our results highlight the heterogeneous nature of climate policy risk exposure. We find sizable reactions that differ by industry as well as across firm-level measures of greenness such as environmental scores and emission intensities. While the financial market response to the IRA was economically significant, it did not lead to instability or financial stress, suggesting that transition risks posed by climate policies even as ambitious as the IRA may be manageable.

 

Ce séminaire aura lieu en mode hybride (le séminaire se tiendra à l’ACPR : 4 Place de Budapest, 75009 Paris avec possibilité de suivre en distanciel)

L’inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire (pour les 2 modes de participation) par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Si vous optez pour le mode visio, le lien de connexion vous sera envoyé prochainement

- Pour nous contacter

- Compte rendu

 

 

Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Effect of U.S. Climate Policy on Financial Markets: An Event Study of the Inflation Reduction Act

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) represents the largest climate policy action ever undertaken in the United States. Its legislative path was marked by two abrupt shifts as the likelihood of climate policy action fell to near zero and then rose...

  • Publié le 06/08/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (293.24 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Borrowing Beyond Bounds: How Banks Pass On Regulatory Compliance Costs

Banks in the euro area must inform supervisors about each exposure that exceed 10% of the bank’s capital. Using a granular dataset that combines banks’ loan and security portfolios, we test whether banks pass on the cost of complying with the large...

  • Publié le 06/08/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (148.23 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Interlocking directorates and competition in banking

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we...

  • Publié le 29/05/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (620.78 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Bank Specialization and Corporate Innovation

Theory offers conflicting predictions on whether and how lenders’ sectoral specialization affects firms’ innovation output. In this paper, we therefore empirically examine the effect of bank specialization on corporate innovation. We find that the sign...

  • Publié le 14/03/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (761.65 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Climate-related Disclosure Commitment of the Lenders, Credit Rationing, and Borrower Environmental Performance

Using lenders becoming members of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as a plausible exogeneous shock, we examine whether and how lenders’ commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures affects borrower firms’...

  • Publié le 21/02/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (217.68 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Central-bank account for all : Efficiency and risk taking

We study optimal policy for a central bank that supplies interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves. We model a CBDC that competes with bank deposits as a medium of exchange. Monopolistic banks issue deposits to lend to...

  • Publié le 25/01/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (178.86 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Social media as a Bank Run Catalyst

Social media fueled a bank run on Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), and the effects were felt broadly in the U.S. banking industry. We employ comprehensive Twitter data to show that preexisting exposure to social media predicts bank stock market losses in the...

  • Publié le 25/01/2024
  • FR
  • PDF (1.25 Mo)