Monthly seminars "chaire ACPR"

 

The ACPR Research Initiative seminar highlights high-quality research addressing issues of regulation and systemic risk for both banks and insurance firms. 

The seminar takes place on the first Wednesday of the month from 10.00 to 11.30 in the premises of the ACPR: 4, place de Budapest, Salle Liège (rez-de-jardin) -  See access plan.  

The seminar is open to everybody. Registration by email at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr is free but compulsory in order to attend. If you wish to be informed of upcoming events, please send an email to the same address.

The ACPR Studies Department organizes independent seminars as well: the page dedicated to the ACPR research seminars is available here.

 

NEXT EVENT

Wednesday, 3rd April 2024, 10.30 am – 12 pm

Enrico Sette (Bank of Italy) will present

“Interlocking directorates and competition in banking”

 

Abstract:

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.

 

Please note that this seminar will take place in a hybrid mode (the seminar will take place at the ACPR 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris , and will also be streamed online).

(Free) registration (for both in person or online participation) is compulsory by mail at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

If you opt for online participation, the connection details will be sent to you in the following days.

TO CONTACT US

 

PREVIOUS EVENT

Wednesday, 6th March 2024, 10.30 am – 12 pm

Olivier de Jonghe (National Bank of Belgium and Tilburg University) will present

“ Bank Specialization and Corporate Innovation ”

 

Abstract:

Theory offers conflicting predictions on whether and how lenders’ sectoral specialization affects firms’ innovation output. In this paper, we therefore empirically examine the effect of bank specialization on corporate innovation. We find that the sign and the magnitude of this effect varies with the degree of “asset overhang” risk across sectors, which is the risk that a new technology has negative spillovers on the value of a bank’s original loan portfolio. Using patent data to measure firms’ innovation output, our results show that bank specialization improves innovation for firms operating in sectors with low asset overhang risk, but impedes innovation for firms operating in sectors with high asset overhang risk. These results hold for four different measures of asset overhang risk and various robustness checks. We further find that these heterogeneous effects arise through financial contracting. On average, bank specialization eases firms’ financing conditions, but this does not hold for firms operating in innovative sectors with high asset overhang risk. Overall, our findings provide novel insights into the dual facets of bank specialization and, more broadly, the link between banking and innovation.

 

Please note that this seminar will take place in a hybrid mode (the seminar will take place at the ACPR 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris , and will also be streamed online).

(Free) registration (for both in person or online participation) is compulsory by mail at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

If you opt for online participation, the connection details will be sent to you in the following days.

TO CONTACT US

 

Publication Seminars
Bank resolution and the structure of global banks

We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers...

  • Published on 12/15/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (430.5 KB)
Publication Seminars
Adverse Selection on maturity : Evidence from online Consumer

Longer loan maturity provides borrowers with insurance against future changes in the price of credit. The present paper examines whether, consistent with theories of insurance markets with private information, maturity choice leads to adverse selection...

  • Published on 11/08/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.44 MB)
Publication Seminars
Lending Standards Over the Credit Cycle

We analyze how rms' segmentation into credit classes aects the lending standards applied by banks to small and medium enterprises over the cycle. We exploit an institutional feature of the Italian credit market that generates a discontinuity in...

  • Published on 10/04/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1 MB)
Publication Seminars
Why risk is so hard to measure ?

This paper analyzes the reliability of standard approaches for Financial risk analysis. We focus on the difference between value–at–risk and expected shortfall, their small sample properties, the scope for underreporting risk and how estimation can be...

  • Published on 09/13/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (247.23 KB)
Publication Seminars
The Run for Safety : Financial Fragility and Deposit Insurance

We study a run on uninsured deposits in Danish banks triggered by a reform that limited deposit insurance coverage. Using a unique dataset with information about all individual bank accounts, we show that the reform caused a 50% decrease in deposits...

  • Published on 06/07/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.36 MB)
Publication Seminars
Winning Connections? Lobbying and the Resolution of Failed Banks

This paper studies how lobbying activities affect the resolution of failed banks during the Great Recession. We show evidence from failed-bank auctions that lobbying increases a bidder’s probability of winning by 26.4 percentage points. The transfer to...

  • Published on 04/05/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (956.73 KB)
Publication Seminars
Regulatory reform and risk-taking : replacing ratings

We analyze a reform of insurance companies’ capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities. First, credit ratings were replaced as inputs to capital regulation. Second, the redesigned system ensures capital buffers sufficient to withstand expected...

  • Published on 03/15/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (697.42 KB)
Publication Seminars
The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance

We introduce a novel instrument to identify exogenous variation in the intensity of supervision across U.S. bank holding companies based on the size rank of a firm within its Federal Reserve district. We demonstrate that supervisors record more hours...

  • Published on 02/01/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (665.34 KB)
Publication Seminars
What drives the expansion of the peer-to-peer lending?

Peer-to-peer lending platforms are online intermediaries that match lenders with borrowers. We use data from the two leading online lenders, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore main drivers of their expansion in the United States. We exploit the...

  • Published on 01/04/2017
  • FR
  • PDF (1.52 MB)