Séminaire mensuel de la Chaire ACPR « Régulation et Risque Systémique »

 

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR, organisé mensuellement, se concentre sur les questions de régulation et de risque systémique pour les banques et les organismes d’assurance. Cette page présente les éléments relatifs aux événements, passés ou à venir, ainsi que les modalités de participation.

Le séminaire de la Chaire ACPR se déroule habituellement le premier mercredi de chaque mois de 10h00 à 11h30 à l’ACPR : 4 rue de Budapest, Salle Liège (rez-de-jardin) - Voir plan d'accès.  

Le séminaire est ouvert à tous. L’inscription par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr est gratuite mais obligatoire pour y assister. Si vous souhaitez être informés des prochains évènements, merci d’envoyer un mail à la même adresse.

La Direction des Études de l’ACPR organise également des séminaires indépendants : la page dédiée aux séminaires de recherche organisés par l’ACPR est accessible ici.

 

PROCHAIN ÉVÉNEMENT 

Mercredi 10 novembre 2021, 10h30 - 12h00

Xavier Vives (University of Navarra - IESE Business School, UPF, CEPR et CESifo) présentera

Information Technology and Bank Competition

Abstract : We consider a spatial model of bank competition to study how the diffusion of information technology affects competition in the lending market, stability of the banking sector, and social welfare. We find that the effects of an improvement in information technology depend on whether or not it weakens the influence of bank-borrower distance on monitoring/screening costs. If so, then bank competition intensifies, which reduces bank stability and brings about an ambiguous welfare effect. Otherwise, competition intensity does not vary, banks are more stable, and welfare improves. If banks have local monopolies, then technological progress always improves social welfare.

Attention, ce séminaire aura lieu en vidéoconférence.

Pour recevoir le lien de connexion, l'inscription (gratuite) est obligatoire par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Pour nous contacter

Article

 

DERNIER ÉVÉNEMENT

Mercredi 06 octobre 2021, 10h30 - 12h00

Grigory Vilkov (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management) présentera

« Pricing Climate Change Exposure »

Attention ce séminaire aura lieu en vidéoconférence.

Pour recevoir le lien de connexion, l'ins cription (gratuite) est obligatoire par mail à chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr

Pour nous contacter

Article

Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
On the direct and indirect real effects of credit supply shocks

We consider the real effects of bank lending shocks and how they permeate the economy through buyer-supplier linkages. We combine administrative data on all firms in Spain with a matched bank-firm-loan dataset incorporating information on the universe...

  • Publié le 27/12/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (897.65 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Private Production of Safe Assets

Do claims on the private sector serve the role of safe assets? We answer this question using high-frequency panel data on prices and quantities of certificates of deposit (CDs) issued in Europe. We find that only very short-term private securities...

  • Publié le 06/12/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (1.22 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Forced Safety Effect : How Higher Capital Requirements Can Increase Bank Lending

Government guarantees generate an implicit subsidy for banks. Even though a capital requirement reduces this subsidy, a bank may optimally respond to a higher capital requirement by increasing lending. This requires that the marginal loan generates...

  • Publié le 22/11/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (1.13 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Foreign Currency Bank Funding and Global Factors

The literature on the drivers of capital flows stresses the prominent role of global financial factors. Recent empirical work, however, highlights how this role varies across countries and time, and this heterogeneity is not well understood. We revisit...

  • Publié le 25/10/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (573.08 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Back to the Future : Backtesting Systemic Risk Measures during Historical Bank Runs and the Great Depression

We evaluate the performance of two popular systemic risk measures, CoVaR and SRISK, during eight financial panics in the era before FDIC insurance. Bank stock price and balance sheet data were not readily available for this time period. We rectify this...

  • Publié le 25/09/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (2.1 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Credit Growth and the Financial Crisis: A New Narrative

A broadly accepted view contends that the 2007-09 nancial crisis in the U.S. was caused by an expansion in the supply of credit to subprime borrowers during the 2001-2006 credit boom, leading to the spike in defaults and foreclosures that sparked the...

  • Publié le 02/05/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (1.85 Mo)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
The Impact of Legal Framework on Bank Loan Portfolio: An implementation to the European Stress Test Exercise

The economic crisis put financial and banking sector on the viewfinder of regulators and policymakers across EU and more widely across the world. Indeed, the improvement of the quality of banks' balance sheet has proved crucial for economic...

  • Publié le 07/03/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (548.8 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation

This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on sound compensation. Banks in jurisdictions which implemented the FSB’s...

  • Publié le 25/01/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (981.25 Ko)
Publication Chaire ACPR régulation et risque systèmique
Risk-sharing benefits and the capital structure of insurance companies

Providing risk-sharing benefits to risk-averse policy holders is a primary function of insurance companies. We model that policy holders are paying a fee over the present value of indemnifications (i.e., technical provisions) to enjoy these risksharing...

  • Publié le 10/01/2018
  • FR
  • PDF (907.97 Ko)