Bank resolution and the structure of global banks
We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a more robust multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is pre-assigned, is preferable. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between ecient bank resolution and the operational structure and risks of global banks.
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- Published on 12/15/2017
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Updated on: 06/12/2018 10:29